Creek: Low-latency, Mixed-Consistency Transactional Replication Scheme by Kobus, Tadeusz et al.
Creek: a General Mixed-Consistency Transactional
Replication Scheme∗
Tadeusz Kobus, Maciej Kokocin´ski, and Paweł T. Wojciechowski
Institute of Computing Science
Poznan´ University of Technology
60-965 Poznan´, Poland
Email: {Tadeusz.Kobus,Maciej.Kokocinski,Pawel.T.Wojciechowski}@cs.put.edu.pl
Abstract—In this paper we introduce Creek, a low-latency,
eventually consistent replication scheme that also enables exe-
cution of strongly consistent requests. Creek disseminates the
messages among the replicas using only a gossip protocol.
Similarly to state machine replication (SMR), Creek totally-
orders all requests, but does so using two different mechanisms: a
timestamp-based one and one built on top of our novel broadcast
primitive, conditional atomic broadcast (CAB). The former is
used to establish a tentative order of all requests for speculative
execution and works also within each partition, when partitioning
of network occurs. On the other hand, CAB is used only for the
strongly consistent requests to ensure their linearizable execution,
and is available whenever distributed consensus can be solved.
The execution of a strongly consistent request also stabilizes the
execution order of the causally related weakly consistent requests.
Creek uses multiversion concurrency control to efficiently handle
requests’ rollbacks and reexecutions resulting from the mismatch
between the tentative and the final execution orders. In the tests
conducted using the TPC-C benchmark, Creek offers up to 3
times lower latency in returning client responses compared to
the state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme, while maintaining
high accuracy of the speculative execution (92-100%).
Index Terms—eventual consistency, fault-tolerance, transac-
tional replication, mixed-consistency state machine replication
I. INTRODUCTION
A lot of research has been devoted in the last years to even-
tually consistent replicated data stores, such as modern NoSQL
databases (e.g., [1] [2] [3]). It is because these systems,
unlike their strongly consistent counterparts (e.g., traditional
relational database systems [4]), are scalable, guarantee high
availability, and provide low response times. These traits make
them the essential tools used to build globally accessible
services running on the Internet, that are able to cope with
the traffic generated by millions of clients.
Developing systems or services using eventually consistent
data stores is often difficult and error prone, because one needs
to anticipate the possibility of working on skewed data due
to weaker consistency guarantees provided by such a data
∗The POIR.04.04.00-00-5C5B/17-00 project is carried out within the
TEAM programme of the Foundation for Polish Science co-financed by
the European Union under the European Regional Development Fund. The
experimental evaluation has been carried out using the computing resources
provided by the Poznan´ Supercomputing and Networking Center (PSNC).
store.1 Moreover, programmers, who are used to traditional
relational database systems, miss the fully fledged support for
serializable transactions, which, naturally, cannot be provided
in a highly-available fashion [6] [7]. Therefore, in recent years,
various NoSQL vendors started adding (quasi) transactional
support to their systems. These add-on mechanisms are often
very prohibitive and do not perform well. For example, both
Riak and Apache Cassandra do not offer cross-object/cross-
record transactions [8] [9]. Additionally, Riak allows strongly
consistent (serializable) operations to be performed only on
distinct data [8], whereas using the so called light weight
transactions in Apache Cassandra on data that are accessed
also in the regular, eventually consistent fashion leads to
undefined behaviour [10].
In the past various researchers attempted to incorporate
transactional semantics into eventually consistent systems.
Among others, the proposed solutions assumed weaker guar-
antees for transactional execution (e.g., [11] [12] [13]) or
restricting the semantics of transactions (e.g., [14] [15]). Inter-
estingly, the first eventually consistent transactional systems,
namely Bayou [16] and the implementations of Eventually-
Serializable Data Services (ESDS) [17], followed a different
approach. In these systems, each server speculatively total-
orders all received client requests without prior agreement
with other servers. The final request serialization is established
by a primary server. In case the speculation is wrong, some
of the requests are rolled back and reexecuted (Bayou), or,
to obtain the response for a new client request, much of
the requests whose final execution order is not yet estab-
lished are repeatedly reexecuted (ESDS). Understandably, such
implementations cannot perform and scale well. Moreover,
they are not fault-tolerant because of the reliance on the
primary. However, these systems have one very important trait:
reasoning about their behaviour is relatively easy and comes
intuitively, because, similarly to state machine replication
(SMR) [18] [19], which executes all requests on all servers
in the same order, on each server there is always a single
serialization of all client requests the server knows about.
1Using conflict-free replicated data types (CRDTs) [5] may help to some
degree, as CRDTs offer clear guarantees and hassle-free state convergence.
However, CRDTs have limited semantics: they either require that the oper-
ations they define always commute, or that there exist some commutative,
associative and idempotent state merge procedures.
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In this paper we take inspiration from Bayou and ESDS,
and propose Creek, a novel fault-tolerant transactional repli-
cation scheme that features mixed weak-and-strong semantics.
Clients submit requests to Creek in a form of arbitrary (but
deterministic) transactions, called operations, each marked as
weak or strong. Creek executes weak operations optimistically
thus ensuring low-latency responses, in the order correspond-
ing to the operations’ timestamps that are assigned upon
operation submission. On the other hand, strong operations are
executed optimistically (similarly to weak operations), yield-
ing tentative responses, but eventually their final operation
serialization is established and a stable response is returned to
the client. The final operation execution order is established
using our new total order protocol, called conditional atomic
broadcast (CAB), which is based on indirect consensus [20].
The messages broadcast using CAB are as small as possible
and are limited to the identifiers of strong operations. The
contents of all (weak and strong) operations are disseminated
among Creek replicas using only a gossip protocol. Creek
leverages multiversioning scheme [21] to facilitate concurrent
execution of operations as well as to minimize the number of
necessary operation rollbacks and reexecutions.
Creek can gracefully tolerate (partial) node failures, because
CAB can be efficiently implemented by extending a quorum-
based protocol, such as Multi-Paxos [22]. When network
partitions occur, replicas within each partition are still capable
of executing weak operations and obtaining tentative responses
to strong operations, and converging to the same state (when
the stream of client request ceases). Formally Creek guaran-
tees linearizability [23] for strong operations, and fluctuating
eventual consistency [24] for weak operations.
Creek causally binds the execution of strong and weak
operations, so that the execution of operations of different
types is not entirely independent. More precisely, for any
strong operation op, if its tentative response was produced
on a replica state that included the effects of the execution of
some weak operation op′, the stable response of op will also
reflect the effects of the execution of op′.
We use the TPC-C benchmark [25] to test the perfor-
mance of Creek in comparison to other replication schemes
that enable arbitrary transactional semantics and from which
Creek draws inspiration: Bayou, SMR, and a state-of-the-art
speculative SMR scheme [26]. By leveraging the multicore
architecture of modern hardware, Creek easily outperforms
SMR and Bayou. Creek provides throughput that is on-par
with the speculative SMR scheme, but exhibits much lower
latencies in serving client requests (up to 3 times lower for
weak transactions and up to 15% lower for strong transac-
tions). In the vast majority of cases (92-100%, depending on
the scenario), the effects of the speculative request execution
correspond to the final execution order as established by
solving distributed consensus among Creek replicas.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. We
discuss related work and specify the system model in Sections
II and III. Next, in Section IV we specify CAB, our new
broadcast protocol. In Section V we present the Creek scheme
and then evaluate it in Section VI. We conclude in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
As we already stated earlier, Creek is inspired by Bayou [16]
and ESDS [17]. There are a number of subtle characteristics of
both systems that we have not yet mentioned. Unlike in Creek,
in Bayou updating transactions do not provide return values.
Bayou also features dependency check and merge procedure
mechanisms, that allow the system to perform application-
level conflict detection and resolution. We do not make any
(strong) assumptions on the specification of operations handled
by Creek (see also Section V-A), so these mechanisms can be
emulated on the level of operation specification, if required.
Creek fulfills the specification of ESDS, although ESDS
features somewhat richer interface than Creek, because it
allows the user to attach to an operation an arbitrary causal
context that must be satisfied before the operation is executed.
However, Creek can be easily extended to accommodate the
full specification of ESDS. Interestingly, the basic implemen-
tation of ESDS [17] did not maintain an up-to-date state that
is updated every time a new operation is executed. Instead, in
order to obtain a response to an operation, ESDS first created a
provisional state by reexecuting (some of) the previously sub-
mitted operations. Local computation was assumed to happen
instantaneously. Naturally, this assumption is not realistic, so
an optimized version of ESDS has been implemented, which,
to some degree, limited the number of operation reexecutions
and network usage [27].
We are aware of several systems that similarly to Creek
feature requests that can be executed with different consistency
guarantees. The system in [28] enables enforcing two kinds
of stronger guarantees than causal consistency, by either a
consistent numbering of requests, or the use of the three-phase-
commit protocol. Unlike Creek, the system does not enforce
a single total order of all client requests. Zeno [29] is very
similar to Bayou, but it has been designed to tolerate Byzan-
tine failures. Li et al. [30] demonstrate Gemini, a replicated
system that satisfies RedBlue consistency. Gemini ensures
causal consistency for all operations, but unlike the strong
(red) operations, the weak (blue) operations must commute
with all other operations. Burckhardt et al. [31] describe
global sequence protocol (GSP), in which client applications
perform operations locally and periodically synchronize with
the cloud, the single source of truth. The cloud is responsible
for establishing the final operation execution order. Changes
to the execution order might lead to operation rollbacks and
reexecutions in the client applications. When the cloud is
unavailable, GSP does not guarantee progress: the clients can
issue new operations that are executed locally, but they are not
propagated to other clients. In effect, when the cloud is down,
each client is forced to work in a separate network partition.
Since in Creek all operations are eventually serialized, the
research on speculative execution in state machine replication
(SMR) is also relevant. In basic SMR, every server sequentially
executes all client requests (transactions) in the same order
[18] [19]. To this end, SMR might rely on the atomic broadcast
(AB) (also called total order broadcast) protocol to ensure that
all servers deliver the same set of requests in the same order.
The speculative schemes based on SMR (e.g., [32] [33] [26])
start the execution of a request before the final operation order
is established, to minimize latency in providing response to
the client. However, the response is withheld until the system
ensures the execution is serializable. Hence, these approaches
do not guarantee low-latency responses.
To enable SMR to scale, some schemes (e.g., [34] [35]) uti-
lize partial replication, in which data is divided into partitions,
each of which can be accessed and modified independently.
The issue of data partitioning is orthogonal to speculative
execution and lies outside the scope of this paper. We leave
extending Creek to support partial replication for future work.
In Section VI we compare the performance of Creek to
the performance of Bayou, SMR as well as Archie [26], the
state-of-the-art speculative SMR scheme. Archie uses a variant
of optimistic atomic broadcast to disseminate requests among
servers that guarantees that in the stable conditions (when
the leader of the broadcast protocol does not change), the
optimistic message delivery order is the same as the final one.
Similarly to Creek, Archie utilizes multiversioning scheme and
takes full advantage of the multi-core hardware.
Recently there have been several attempts to formalize
the guarantees provided by Bayou and systems similar to it.
Shapiro et al. [36] propose a (rather informal) definition of
capricious total order, in which each server total-orders all
operations it received, without prior agreement with others.
In [37], Girault et al. propose a more formal property called
monotonic prefix consistency. The definition is, however, lim-
ited to systems that, unlike Creek, only feature read-only
operations and updating operations that do not have a return
value. To formalize Creek’s correctness we use the framework
and a property called fluctuating eventual consistency that we
introduced in [24] (see Section V-B).
III. MODEL
We consider a fully asynchronous, message-passing system
consisting of a set Π = {p1, ..., pn} of processes, to which
external clients submit requests in the form of operations (also
called transactions) to be executed by the processes. We model
each process, which we call a replica, as a state automaton,
that has a local state and, in reaction to events, executes steps
that atomically transition the replica from one state to another.
We consider a crash-stop failure model, in which a process can
crash by ceasing communication. A replica that never crashes
is said to be correct, otherwise it is faulty.
Replicas communicate via reliable channels. Replicas can
use reliable broadcast (RB) [38], that is defined through two
primitives: RB-cast and RB-deliver. Intuitively, RB guaran-
tees that even in case a faulty replica RB-casts some message
m and it is RB-delivered by at least one correct replica, all
other correct replicas eventually RB-deliver m. Formally, RB
requires: (1) validity: if a correct replica RB-casts some mes-
sage m, then the replica eventually RB-delivers m, (2) uni-
form integrity: for any message m, every process RB-delivers
m at most once and only if m was previously RB-cast, and
(3) agreement: if a correct replica RB-delivers some message
m, then eventually all replicas RB-deliver m.
As we have already outlined earlier, clients may issue two
kinds of operations: weak and strong. Weak operations are
meant to be executed in a way that minimizes the latency in
providing a response to the client. Hence, we require that a
replica that received a weak operation executes it immediately
in an eventually consistent fashion on the local state and
issues a response to the client without waiting for coordination
with other replicas. This behaviour is necessary (but not
sufficient) to ensure that in the presence of network partitions
(when communication between subgroups of replicas is not
possible for long enough), the replicas’ states in each subgroup
converge once the stream of client requests ceases. Naturally,
a response to a weak operation might not be correct, in the
sense that it might not reflect the state of replicas once they
synchronize. On the other hand, a replica returns to a client a
(stable) response to a strong operation only after the replicas
synchronize and achieve agreement on the final operation exe-
cution order (relative to other, previously handled operations).
Achieving agreement among distributed consensus. replicas on
how to execute (serialize) a strong operation requires solving
We assume availability of failure detector Ω, the weakest
failure detector capable of solving distributed consensus in
the presence of failures [39].
IV. CONDITIONAL ATOMIC BROADCAST
A. Specification
Similarly to atomic broadcast (AB) (also called total order
broadcast) [40], CAB enables dissemination of messages
among processes with the guarantee that each process delivers
all messages in the same order. Unlike AB, however, CAB
allows a process to defer the delivery of a message until a
certain condition is met (e.g., certain network communication
is completed). To this end, CAB defines two primitives:
CAB-cast(m, q), which is used by processes to broadcast a
message m with a test predicate q (or simply, predicate q),
and CAB-deliver(m) to deliver m on each process but only
when the predicate q is satisfied. Since q might depend on
m, we write q(m) = true if q is evaluated to true (on some
process pi). q needs to guarantee eventual stable evaluation,
i.e., q needs to be a stable predicate that eventually evaluates
to true on every correct process. Otherwise, not only CAB
would not be able to terminate, but different processes could
CAB-deliver different sets of messages. We formalize CAB
through the following requirements:
• validity: if a correct process pi CAB-casts a message m
with predicate q, and eventual stable evaluation holds for
q, then pi eventually CAB-delivers m,
• uniform integrity: for any message m with predicate q,
every process pi CAB-delivers m at most once, and only
if (m, q) was previously CAB-cast and q(m) = true at
pi,
• uniform agreement: if a process pi (correct or faulty)
CAB-delivers m (with predicate q), and eventual stable
evaluation holds for q, then all correct processes eventu-
ally CAB-deliver m (with q),
• uniform total order: if some process pi (correct or faulty)
CAB-delivers m (with predicate q) before m′ (with
predicate q′), then every process pj CAB-delivers m′
(with q′) only after it has CAB-delivered m (with q).
B. Reducing CAB to indirect consensus
There is a strong analogy between CAB and atomic broad-
cast (AB) built using indirect consensus [20]. Our approach
is quite a straightforward extension of the AB reduction to
indirect consensus presented there, as we now discuss.
As shown in [41], AB can be reduced to a series of instances
of distributed consensus. In each instance processes reach
agreement on a set of messages to be delivered. Once the
agreement is reached, messages included in the decision value
are delivered in some deterministic order by each process.
Indirect consensus reduces the latency in reaching agreement
among the processes by distributing the messages (values
being proposed by the processes) using a gossip protocol
and having processes to agree only on the identifiers of the
messages. Hence, a proposal in indirect consensus is a pair
of values (v, rcv), where v is a set of message identifiers
(and msgs(v) are the messages whose identifiers are in v),
and rcv is a function, such that rcv(v) is true only if the
process has received msgs(v). Indirect consensus’ primitives
are almost identical to the ones of classic distributed con-
sensus: propose(k, v, rcv) and decide(k, v), where k is the
number identifying a concrete consensus execution. Naturally,
whenever a decision is taken on v, indirect consensus must
ensure that all correct processes eventually receive msgs(v).
We formalize this requirement by assuming eventual stable
evaluation of rcv(v).2 Formally, indirect consensus requires:
• termination: if eventual stable evaluation holds, then
every correct process eventually decides some value,
• uniform validity: if a process decides v, then (v, rcv) was
proposed by some process,
• uniform integrity: every process decides at most once,
• uniform agreement: no two processes (correct or not)
decide a different value,
• no loss: if a process decides v at time t, then for one
correct process rcv(v) = true at time t.
In indirect consensus, the rcv(v) function explicitly con-
cerns local delivery of messages, whose identifiers are in v.
However, rcv could be replaced by any function f that has the
same properties as rcv , i.e., eventual stable evaluation holds
for f . In CAB, instead of rcv(v), we use a conjunction of
rcv(v) and test predicates q(m) for each CAB-cast message
m, whose identifier is in v. This way we easily obtain an
efficient implementation of CAB, because we minimize the
sizes of propositions, on which consensus is executed. The
complete reduction of CAB to indirect consensus follows the
approach from [20] and is presented in Appendix A. We
formally show that the reduction satisfies the requirements of
2In the original paper [41], this requirement has been called hypothesis A.
CAB. In practice, a very efficient implementation of CAB can
be obtained by slightly modifying the indirect variant of Multi-
Paxos [42].
V. CREEK
A. Basic scheme
Our specification of Creek, shown in Algorithm 1, is rooted
in the specification of the Bayou protocol [16] presented in
[24]. We assume that clients submit requests to the system in
the form of operations with encoded arguments (line 15), and
await responses. Operations are defined by a specification of a
(deterministic) replicated data type F [43] (e.g., read/write op-
erations on a register, list operations, such as append, getFirst,
or arbitrary SQL queries/updates). Each operation is marked as
weak or strong (through the strongOp argument). Operations
are executed on the state object (line 4), which encapsulates
the state of a copy of a replicated object implementing F (see
how StateObject can be implemented in Appendix B).
Upon invocation of an operation op (line 15), it is wrapped
in a Req structure (line 17) that also contains the current times-
tamp (stored in the timestamp field) which will be used to or-
der op among weak operations and strong operations executed
in a tentative way), and its unique identifier (stored in the dot
field, which is a pair consisting of the Creek replica number
i and the value of the monotonically increasing local event
counter currEventNo). Such a package is then distributed
among replicas using some gossip protocol (here represented
by reliable broadcast, line 23; we simply say that op has been
RB-cast and later RB-delivered; through the code in lines 22
and 24 we simulate immediate local RB-delivery of op). If
op is a strong operation, we additionally attach to the message
the causal context of op, i.e., the identifiers of all operations
that have already been RB-delivered by the replica and which
will be serialized before op (line 19).3 This information can be
effectively stored in a dotted version vector (dvv) [44], which
is logically a set of pairs of a replica identifier and an event
number (in the causalCtx variable, line 7, a replica maintains
the identifiers of all operations the replica knows about, see
the routines in lines 26 and 32). For a strong operation, the
replica also CAB-casts the operation’s identifier with a test
predicate specified by the checkDep function (line 20). By
specification of CAB, checkDep(dot) (line 10) is evaluated by
each replica when solving distributed consensus on a concrete
operation identifier dot , that is about to be CAB-delivered,
and then, after the decision has been reached, in an attempt
to CAB-deliver dot locally. The function checks whether
the replica has already RB-delivered the strong operation
op identified by dot , and if so, whether it has also already
RB-delivered all operations that are in the causal context of
op. Note that a replica will CAB-deliver op’s identifier only
if it had already RB-delivered op’s Req structure.
3Operations serialized before op include all operations RB-delivered by
the replica whose final operation execution order is already established, and
other weak operations whose timestamp is smaller than op’s timestamp. Later
we explain why the causal context of op cannot include the identifiers of any
strong operations whose final execution order is not yet determined.
Algorithm 1 The Creek protocol for replica i
1: struct Req(timestamp : int, dot : pair〈int, int〉,
op : ops(F), strongOp : boolean, causalCtx : dvv)
2: operator <(r : Req, r ′ : Req)
3: return (r .timestamp, r .dot) < (r ′.timestamp, r ′.dot)
4: var state : StateObject
5: var currEventNo : int
6: var committed , tentative : list〈Req〉
7: var causalCtx : dvv // logically set〈pair〈int, int〉〉
8: var executed , toBeExecuted , toBeRolledBack : list〈Req〉
9: var reqsAwaitingResp : map〈Req,Resp〉
10: function checkDep(dot : 〈int, int〉)
11: var r = x : (x ∈ (committed · tentative) ∧ x.dot = dot)
12: if r = ⊥ then
13: return false
14: return r.causalCtx ⊆ causalCtx
15: upon invoke(op : ops(F), strongOp : boolean)
16: currEventNo = currEventNo + 1
17: var r = Req(currTime, (i, currEventNo), op, strongOp,⊥)
18: if strongOp then
19: r.causalCtx = causalCtx \ {x.dot|x ∈ tentative ∧ r < x)}
20: CAB-cast(r.dot, checkDep)
21: else
22: causalCtx = causalCtx ∪ {r.dot}
23: RB-cast(r)
24: adjustTentativeOrder(r)
25: reqsAwaitingResp.put(r,⊥)
26: upon RB-deliver(r : Req)
27: if r.dot.first = i then // r issued locally
28: return
29: if ¬r.strongOp then
30: causalCtx = causalCtx ∪ {r.dot}
31: adjustTentativeOrder(r)
32: upon CAB-deliver(dot : pair〈int, int〉)
33: var r = x : (x ∈ tentative ∧ x.dot = dot)
34: causalCtx = causalCtx ∪ {r.dot}
35: commit(r)
36: procedure adjustTentativeOrder(r : Req)
37: var previous = [x|x ∈ tentative ∧ x < r]
38: var subsequent = [x|x ∈ tentative ∧ r < x]
39: tentative = previous · [r] · subsequent
40: var newOrder = committed · tentative
41: adjustExecution(newOrder )
42: procedure adjustExecution(newOrder : list〈Req〉)
43: var inOrder = longestCommonPrefix(executed,newOrder)
44: var outOfOrder = [x|x ∈ executed ∧ x 6∈ inOrder ]
45: executed = inOrder
46: toBeExecuted = [x|x ∈ newOrder ∧ x 6∈ executed]
47: toBeRolledBack = toBeRolledBack · reverse(outOfOrder)
48: procedure commit(r : Req)
49: var committedExt = [x|x ∈ tentative ∧ x.dot ∈ r.causalCtx ]
50: var newTentative = [x|x ∈ tentative ∧ x 6∈ committedExt ∧ x 6= r]
51: committed = committed · committedExt · [r]
52: tentative = newTentative
53: var newOrder = committed · tentative
54: adjustExecution(newOrder )
55: if reqsAwaitingResp.contains(r) ∧ r ∈ executed then
56: return reqsAwaitingResp.get(r) to client (as stable response)
57: reqsAwaitingResp.remove(r)
58: upon toBeRolledBack 6= []
59: var [head] · tail = toBeRolledBack
60: state.rollback(head)
61: toBeRolledBack = tail
62: upon toBeRolledBack = [] ∧ toBeExecuted 6= []
63: var [head] · tail = toBeExecuted
64: var response = state.execute(head)
65: if reqsAwaitingResp.contains(head) then
66: if ¬head.strongOp then
67: return response to client
68: reqsAwaitingResp.remove(head)
69: else if head.strongOp ∧ head ∈ tentative then
70: reqsAwaitingResp.put(head, response)
71: return response to client (as tentative response)
72: else // head.strongOp ∧ head ∈ committed
73: return response to client (as stable response)
74: reqsAwaitingResp.remove(head)
75: executed = executed · [head]
76: toBeExecuted = tail
When an operation op is RB-delivered (line 26), the replica
adds its identifier to causalCtx if op is a weak operation
(line 30), and then uses op’s timestamp to correctly order op
among other weak operations and strong operations targeted
for speculative execution (on the tentative list of Reqs,
line 39). Then the new operation execution order is established
by concatenating the committed list and the tentative list
(line 40). The committed list maintains the Req structures for
all operations, whose final execution order has already been
established. Then, the adjustExecution function (line 42)
compares the newly established operation execution order
with the order in which (some) operations have already been
executed (see the executed variable). Operations, for which the
orders are different, need to be rolled back (in order opposite
to their execution order) and reexecuted. In an ideal case, op
is simply added to the end of the toBeExecuted list, and
awaits execution.4 To limit the number of possible rollbacks,
local clocks, which are used to generate timestamps for Req
structures, should not deviate too much from each other.
When an operation op’s identifier is CAB-delivered
(line 32), the replica can commit op, i.e., establish its final
execution order. To this end, the replica firstly stabilizes
some of the operations, i.e., moves the Req structures of
4Note that no rollbacks will be required also when operation execution
lags a bit behind the RB-delivery of operations. In such case, the tail of the
toBeExecuted list will undergo reordering.
all operations included in the causal context of op from the
tentative list to the end of the committed list (line 49). Then
the replica add op’s Req structure to the end of the committed
list as well (line 51). Note that this procedure maintains
the relative order in which weak operations from the causal
context of op appear on the tentative list. This procedure
also maintains the causal precedence of those operations in
relation to op. All operations not included in the causal
context of op stay on the tentative list (line 50). As before,
the adjustExecution function is called to mark some of the
executed operations for rollback and reexecution (line 54).
Note that in an ideal case, operations (including op) can
be moved from the tentative to the committed list without
causing any rollbacks or reexecutions. Unfortunately, if any
(weak) operation submitted to some other replica is ordered
in-between operations from the causal context of op, and some
of these operations are already executed, rollbacks cannot be
avoided in the basic version of Creek. In Section V-C we
discuss how this situation can be mitigated to some extent.
Recall that the causal context of a strong operation op does
not include the identifiers of any strong operations that are not
yet committed. We cannot include such dependencies because,
ultimately, the order of strong operations is established by
CAB, which is unaware of the semantics and the possible
causal dependency between messages sent through CAB.
Hence, the order of strong operations established by CAB
could be different from the order following from the causal
dependency we would have had defined. In principle, such
dependencies could be enforced using Zab [45] or executive
order broadcast [46]. However, these schemes would have to
be extended to accommodate the capabilities of CAB. We
opted not to further complicate the presentation of Creek. In
Creek, the identifier dot of a strong operation op is added to
the global variable causalCtx (which we use to create a causal
context for all strong operations) only upon CAB-deliver. But
then we commit op, thus establishing its final execution order.
Operation rollbacks and executions happen within tran-
sitions specified in lines 58–61 and 62–76. Whenever an
operation is executed on a replica given, the replica check
whether the operation has been originally submitted to this
replica (line 65). Then, when necessary, it returns the response
to the client. Note that in our pseudocode, before a client
receives a stable response to a strong operation, it may
receive multiple tentative responses, one for each time the
operation is (re)executed. Sometimes the replica returns a
stable response in the commit function (line 48). It happens
when a strong operation has been speculatively executed in an
order equivalent to its final execution order.
B. Correctness
The most faithful description of the characteristics of Creek
can be made using the framework from [24], where we
analyze the behaviour and then formalize the guarantees of the
seminal Bayou protocol [16]. Creek’s principle of operation
is very similar to Bayou’s, and so Creek also exhibits some
of Bayou’s quirky behaviour. Most crucially, Creek allows
for temporary operation reordering, which means that the
replicas may temporarily disagree on the relative order in
which the operations submitted to the system were executed.
In consequence, clients may observe operation return values
which do not correspond to any operation execution order that
can be produced by traditional relational database systems or
typical NoSQL systems. As we prove, this characteristics is
unavoidable in systems that mix weak and strong consistency.
The basic version of Creek is also not free of the other two
traits of Bayou mentioned in [24], namely circular causality
and unbounded wait-free execution of operations. The former
can be mitigated in a similar fashion as in Bayou.
Formally, the guarantees provided by Creek can be ex-
pressed using Fluctuating Eventual Consistency (FEC) [24], a
property that precisely captures temporary operation reorder-
ing and is not tied to a concrete data type.5 In Appendix C
we argue why Creek satisfies FEC for weak operations and
sequential consistency [47] for strong operations.
C. High-performance protocol
An obvious optimization of Creek involves executing weak
read-only operations without performing any network commu-
nication with other replicas. This optimization does not address
the core limitation of Creek, which comes from excessive
5Creek does not make any assumptions on the semantics of operations
issued to replicas other than that operations must be deterministic.
number of operation rollbacks and reexecutions. To improve
Creek’s performance, we modified Creek in several ways. In
our discussion below we focus on the updating operations.
Since rolling back operations is costly, we need to perform
rollbacks only if necessary. Suppose there are two already
executed operations opi, opj ∈ tentative , and opi appears
before opj on tentative . If opj is moved to committed (e.g.,
because opj is being committed and opi does not belong to
the causal context of opj), the basic version of Creek must
rollback both operations and reexecute them but in the opposite
order. However, if opi and opj operated on distinct data, no
rollbacks or reexecutions are necessary (at least with respect to
only these two operations). Typical workloads exhibit locality,
i.e., the requests do not access all data items with uniform
probability [48]. Hence, such an optimization brings dramatic
improvement in Creek’s performance.
To facilitate efficient handling of situations similar to the
one described above, we extended Creek with multiversioning
scheme [21]. The modified version of Creek holds multiple
immutable objects called versions for data items accessed by
operations. Versions are maintained within a version store.
Each version is created during execution of some operation
op and is marked using a special timestamp that corresponds
to the location of op on the committed · tentative list. The
execution of any operation op happens in isolation, on a valid
snapshot. It means that the snapshot includes all and only the
versions created as the result of execution of all operations
op′, such that op′ appears before op on committed · tentative
at the time of execution of op. A rollback of op does not
dispose of versions created during its execution. Instead, all
versions created during execution of op are marked, so they
are not included in the snapshots used during execution of all
operations op′ that start execution after the rollback of op.
A rollback of op may cascade into rollbacks of other oper-
ations. Suppose as before that there are two already executed
operations opi, opj ∈ tentative and opi appears before opj
on tentative . Suppose also that opx is RB-delivered, and
opx has a lower timestamp than opi. In the basic version of
Creek, both opi and opj would be rolled back and reexecuted
after the execution of opx. Thanks to multiversioning, we can
execute opx on a consistent snapshot corresponding to the
desired order of opx on tentative and then check, whether
the execution of opx created new versions for any objects
read by opi. If not, we do not need to roll opi back and we
can proceed to check in a similar way the possible conflict
between opx and opj . On the other hand, if opi is rolled
back, we need to check for conflicts between opx and opj as
well as between opi and opj , because opj might have read
some no longer valid versions created by opi.
Note that one needs to be careful in garbage collecting
versions. Since a newly RB-delivered operation can be placed
in the middle of the tentative list, we need to maintain
all versions produced during execution of the operations on
the tentative list. We track live operations (operations being
executed) to see which snapshots they operate on. This way
we never garbage collect versions that might be used by live
operations. Having that in mind, for each data item we can
attempt to garbage collect all versions which were created
during executions of operations op ∈ committed , except for
the most recently created value. We can also eventually remove
all versions created by operations that were later rolled back
(by specification of Creek, new transactions that start execution
after the rollback already happened will not include the rolled
back versions in their snapshots).
Under normal operation, when strong operations are com-
mitted every once in a while, the number of versions for each
data item should remain roughly the same. However, when
no strong operations are being committed (because no strong
operations are submitted for a longer period of time or no
message can be CAB-delivered due to a network partition),
the number of versions starts to grow. We could counter
such a situation by, e.g., periodically issuing strong no-op
operations, that would gradually stabilize weak operations.
Otherwise, we need to maintain all versions created by opera-
tions op ∈ tentative . In such case, we could limit the amount
of data we need to store, by collecting complete snapshots (that
represent some prefix of committed · tentative), and recreate
some versions when needed, by reexecuting some previously
executed operations on the snapshot.
Thanks to multiversioning, we could relatively easily further
extend Creek to the support concurrent execution of multiple
operations. Having multiple operations execute concurrently
does not violate correctness, because each operation executes
in isolation and on a consistent snapshot. The newly created
versions are added to our version store after the operation
completes execution. We do so atomically and only after
we checked for conflicts with other concurrently executed
operations which already completed their execution. In case
of a conflict, we discard versions created during the execution
and reexecute the operation.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Since Creek has been designed with low latency in mind, we
are primarily interested in the on-replica latencies (or simply
latencies) exhibited by Creek when handling client requests
(the time between a replica receives a request from a client and
sends back a response; the network delay in communication
with the client is not included). One can expect that from
a client’s perspective, important are the stable latencies for
strong requests and the tentative latencies for weak requests:
when a request is marked as strong, it means it is essential
for the client to obtain a response that is correct (results from
a state that is agreed upon by replicas). On the other hand,
weak requests are to be executed in an eventually consistent
fashion, so the client expects that the tentative response might
not be 100% accurate (i.e., the same as the stable response
produced once the request is stabilized).
We compare the latencies exhibited by Creek with the
latencies produced by other replication schemes that enable
arbitrary semantics. To this end we test Creek against SMR
[18] [19], Archie [26] (a state-of-the-art speculative SMR),
and Bayou [16] (mainly due its historical significance). For all
systems we also measure the average CPU load and network
congestion. Moreover, for Creek and Archie we check the
accuracy of the speculative execution, i.e., the percentage
of weak operations, for which the first speculative execution
yielded results that match the ultimate results corresponding
to this request. Archie, as specified in [26], does not return
tentative responses after completing speculative execution. We
can however predict what would be the tentative latency for
Archie and thus we plot it alongside stable latency.
Recall that Creek (similarly to Bayou) uses a gossip protocol
to disseminate (both weak and strong) operations among repli-
cas. To ensure minimal communication footprint of the inter-
replica synchronization necessary for strong operations, Creek
uses an indirect consensus-based implementation of CAB. On
the other hand, Archie and efficient SMR implementations
(e.g., [49]) disseminate entire messages (operations) solely
through atomic broadcast (AB). Since our goal is to conduct
a fair comparison between the schemes, our implementations
of SMR and Archie rely on a variant of AB that is also based
on indirect consensus.
A. Test environment
We test the systems in a simulated environment, which
allows us to conduct a fair comparison: all systems share
the same implementation of the data store abstraction and the
networking stack, the sizes of the exchanged messages are
uniform across systems (apart from the additional messages
exchanged through CAB in Creek), and all statistics related
to the test executions are measured in the same fashion. We
simulate a 5-replica system connected via 1Gbps network.
Each replica can run up to 16 tasks in parallel (thus simulating
a 16-core CPU).
For our tests we use TPC-C [25], a popular OLTP bench-
mark. Every test run involves a uniform stream of client
requests (transactions), each randomly marked weak or strong
and sent to a randomly chosen replica. The fraction of strong
transactions in the workload depends on the strong transaction
percentage (stxp) parameter, set to 10%. The network com-
munication latencies are set to represent the typical latencies
achieved in a data center (0.2-0.3 ms). To simulate different
contention levels, we conduct tests with the TPC-C scale factor
set to 1 and 5 (the dataset contains either 1 or 5 warehouses;
smaller number of warehouses means higher contention).
B. Test results
In Figure 1 we present the on-replica latencies for all
systems in the function of achieved throughput. In all tests
the network is not saturated for any of the systems: messages
exchanged between the replicas are small and transactions take
a significant time to execute.
SMR and Bayou, whose maximum throughput is about 2.7k
txs/s (regardless of the contention level), are easily outper-
formed by Creek and Archie, both of which take advantage
of multicore architecture. The latter systems’ peak throughput
is about 12k txs/s for the high contention scenario and 35k
txs/s for the medium contention scenario. When CPU is not
high contention medium contention
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Figure 1. On-replica latency in a TPC-C test in the high and medium contention scenarios, with 10% of strong operations.
saturated, Creek’s latency for tentative responses (for both
weak and strong transactions) is steady around 0.3 ms, which
corresponds to the average time of executing a TPC-C trans-
action in the simulation. Creek’s latency in obtaining a stable
response is a few times higher, as producing the response
involves inter-replica synchronization. More precisely, to pro-
duce a stable response, a request needs to be CAB-cast, which
means that under our assumptions and using a Paxos-based
implementation of CAB, the request can be CAB-delivered
after 3 communication phases. Hence, network communication
adds at least about 1 ms to the latency. In both medium
and high contention scenarios, the stable latencies for strong
transactions in Creek are about 15% lower compared to the
latencies exhibited by Archie (see also below). In Creek,
CPU utilization gradually increases with the increasing load.
Eventually, the CPU saturates and, when the backlog of
unprocessed transactions starts to build up (as signified by the
latency plot striking up), Creek reaches its peak throughput.
Returning tentative responses makes little sense, when most
of the time they are incorrect (they do not match the stable
responses). Our tests show, however, that the tentative re-
sponses produced by Creek are in the majority of cases correct:
the accuracy of the speculative execution ranges between 92-
100% in the high contention scenario and between 99-100%
in the medium contention scenario (see Figures 2 and 3 in
Appendix D).
The tentative response latency observed for Creek is up
to 3 times smaller than for Archie. It is because before an
Archie’s replica can start processing a transaction, it first needs
to broadcast and deliver it. More precisely, an Archie replica
starts processing a transaction upon optimistic delivery of a
message containing the transaction, which was sent using AB.
The speculative execution in Archie has little impact on stable
latency: on average, before a speculative transaction execution
is completed by an Archie replica, an appropriate AB message
is delivered by the replica, thus confirming the optimistic
delivery order (hence the perfect accuracy of the speculative
execution, see Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix D). It means that a
replica starts the execution of a transaction a bit earlier than it
takes for a message to be delivered by AB. The small benefits
of returning a tentative response earlier can be seen on the
bottom-left and bottom-right plots in Figure 1, which show the
zoomed-in views over the top plots (for modest workloads).6
In the high contention scenario, for both Creek and Archie
the execution ratio (the average number of executions per-
formed for each transactions) gradually increases from 1 to
almost 1.9, when CPU gets saturated (see Figures 2 and 3
in Appendix D). The execution ratio is slightly higher for
Creek compared to Archie’s due to Creek’s higher variance in
the relative order between tentatively executed transactions.
Archie curbs the number of rollbacks and reexecutions by
allowing the replicas to limit the number of concurrently
executed transactions. Moreover, in Archie, when the leader
process of the underlying AB does not change, the optimistic
message delivery order always matches the final delivery order.
For the medium contention scenario, the execution ratio for
both systems ranges from 1 to 1.3, with smaller differences
between the systems.
6The impressive speed-up achieved by Archie, as described in the original
paper [26], was due to network communication latencies, which were about
3-4ms, over 10 times higher than the ones we assume in the simulation.
SMR executes all transactions sequentially, after they have
been delivered by AB. It means that SMR exhibits high latency
compared to Creek and Archie, and has very limited maxi-
mum throughput. Bayou cuts the latency compared to SMR,
because Bayou speculatively executes transactions before the
final transaction execution order is established. However, its
maximum throughput is comparable to SMR’s, as Bayou also
processes all transactions sequentially.
C. Varying test parameters
Now we briefly discuss how the systems’ behaviour change
once we vary the test parameters. The additional test results
are presented in Figures 2, 3 and 4 in Appendix D.
A low contention level (when the scale factor in TPC-C is
set to 20) translates into better overall throughput (about 40k
txs/s) and more uniform latencies for both Creek and Archie.
In this scenario, transactions in both systems are rarely rolled
back (the execution ratio never exceeds 1.1), because there
are few conflicts between concurrently executed transactions.
In these conditions, Creek always achieves perfect accuracy of
speculative execution. Understandably, a low contention level
does not have any impact on the performance of SMR, which
executes all transactions sequentially. Bayou’s performance is
similar to its performance in the other scenarios.
Increasing the percentage of strong transactions means that
the latency of stable responses for strong transactions in
Creek is now a bit closer to Archie’s latency. It is because
now, on average there are fewer transactions in the causal
context of each strong transaction, and thus the transaction
can be CAB-delivered earlier. The smaller causal contexts
also translate into a slightly higher execution ratio, as fewer
transactions can be committed together (recall that a strong
transaction stabilizes weak transactions from its causal context
upon commit). Changes to the stxp parameter neither impacts
the performance of SMR nor Bayou.
Now we consider what happens when transactions take
longer to execute. In the additional tests we increased the
transaction execution time five times. Understandably the
maximum throughput of all systems decreased five times.
The maximum execution ratio for both Creek and Archie
is lower than before, because there are fewer transactions
issued concurrently. Longer execution times also mean that the
inter-replica communication latency has smaller influence on
the overall latency in producing (stable) responses (execution
time dominates network communication time). In effect, when
stxp is high (50%), the latency of stable execution in Creek
matches the (tentative/stable) execution latency in Archie,
and the latency of Bayou is closer to SMR’s. When stxp is
relatively low (10%), the latency for Creek is lower compared
to Archie’s due to the same reasons as before.
Understandably, using machine clusters containing more
replicas do not yield better performance, because all tested
replication schemes assume full replication. Consequently
every replica needs to process all client requests. To improve
the horizontal scalability of Creek, it needs to be adapted to
support partial replication. We leave that for future work.
Using CPUs with more cores has no effect on SMR and
Bayou, but allows Creek and Archie to (equally well) handle
higher load. We skip the plots for these tests, as they resemble
the already shown results but scaled out to higher maximum
throughput values.
D. Limitations
Similarly to Bayou, but unlike Archie and SMR, Creek
remains available under network partitions (naturally, stable
responses for strong transactions are provided only in the
majority partition, if such exists). Under a heavy workload,
Creek takes a long time to reconcile system partitions once
the connection between the partitions is reestablished: the
execution order of many transactions needs to be revisited,
which means that they have to be reexecuted. In principle
there is no other way to do it if we make no assumptions
about the system semantics. Making such assumptions could
allow us in some cases to, e.g., efficiently merge the states of
the replicas from different partitions, as in CRDTs [5].
E. Summary
As shown by the TPC-C tests, Creek greatly improves
the latency compared to Archie, the state-of-the-art specu-
lative SMR system, and also provides much better overall
throughput than SMR and Bayou. In fact, the tentative latency
exhibited by Creek is up to 3 times lower compared to
Archie’s. Moreover, when the percentage of strong transactions
is relatively low, Creek improves the stable latency by 15%
compared to Archie (when the percentage of strong transaction
is high, the stable latencies exhibited by Creek and Archie are
comparable). Crucially, the tentative responses provided by
Creek for both weak and strong transactions are correct in the
vast majority of cases.
Naturally, eventually consistent systems which restrict the
semantics of operations (e.g., by providing only CRUD se-
mantics), such as Apache Cassandra [3], can perform much
better than Creek. It is because these systems limit or avoid
altogether operation reexecutions resulting from changes in
the order in which the updates are processed. However, as
we argued in Section I, these systems are not suitable for all
applications and are difficult to use correctly.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented Creek, a proof-of-concept,
eventually-consistent, transactional scheme that also enables
execution of strongly consistent requests. By its design, Creek
provides low latency in handling client requests and yields
throughput that is comparable with a state-of-the-art specula-
tive SMR scheme. Creek does so while remaining general: it
supports execution of arbitrary (deterministic) transactions. We
believe that the Creek’s principle of operation can be used as
a good starting point for other mixed-consistency replication
schemes which are optimized for more specific use.
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APPENDIX
A. Reducing CAB to indirect consensus
The complete reduction of CAB to indirect consensus fol-
lows the approach from [20] and is presented in Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2 each process maintains a set of
RB-delivered messages in received . We use the unordered set
to keep the identifiers of messages received but not yet ordered
by the process, and the ordered list, to store the identifiers of
messages ordered but not yet CAB-delivered by the process.
In order to CAB-cast a message m with predicate t, both
m and t are first RB-cast to other processes (line 8). Once
a process RB-delivers a message, it is added to the received
set (line 12). If the message has not been already ordered, its
identifier is placed in the unordered set (line 14). Whenever
the unordered set is not empty, a process initiates another in-
direct consensus execution and tries to propose the unordered
set (line 17). A process pi agrees to terminate an indirect
consensus instance on a set of message identifiers idSetk
(line 18) only if pi has already RB-delivered all messages,
whose identifiers are in idSetk (as in indirect consensus), but
also for each message the test predicate holds on pi (line 10).
Once a decision on a set of message identifiers is reached,
messages whose identifiers are in idSetk are deterministically
ordered (line 20), and CAB-delivered in a proper order by pi
when the content of the message is available (line 22).
Now we will show that Algorithm 2 satisfies CAB.7 To this
end, we formulate a number of lemmas first.
Lemma 1. Let pi be a correct process. If, for some message
m (with predicate q), id(m) ∈ idSetk at pi, where k is some
decided instance of indirect consensus (IC), then pi eventually
CAB-delivers m.
Proof. We give a proof by contradiction. Assume that pi
never CAB-delivers m, and m is the first such message.
Since id(m) ∈ idSetk, by the algorithm, id(m) on the
ordered list. Since m is the first not CAB-delivered message,
m = ordered .head . Since idSetk has been decided (at some
time t), by the no loss property of IC, the function test has
been evaluated to true at some correct process (say pj) at time
t. Hence for all messages m′, such that id(m′) ∈ idSetk, m
must be RB-delivered at pj at time t, and q(m′) must be true
at pj at time t. By the agreement property of RB pi eventually
RB-delivers all such messages m′ (including m). By eventual
stable evaluation, eventually q(m′) = true at pi. Then, by
the algorithm, pi must CAB-deliver m, which contradicts our
assumption.
Lemma 2. Let pi be any process. If, for some message m
(with predicate q), id(m) ∈ idSetk at pi, where k is some
decided instance of indirect consensus, then there does not
exists process pj and k′ 6= k, so that id(m) ∈ idSetk′ at pj ,
where k′ is some decided instance of indirect consensus.
7The original paper on indirect consensus [20] does not include formal
correctness proofs of the reduction of AB to indirect consensus.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that k < k. Let us
make two observations:
• any process pi can only proceed to round k′ > k after k
is decided at pi, and every process decides only once per
IC instance (by the uniform integrity property of IC),
• any process pi proposes through IC id(m) (for some
message m) only if id(m) ∈ unordered at pi at that
time.
Now we consider two cases:
1) Let m ∈ unordered at pi. It means that pi RB-delivered
m and pi will not RB-deliver m again (by the uniform
integrity property of RB). Since id(m) ∈ idSetk at
pi then id(m) is removed from the unordered set and
subsequently added to the ordered list on pi. Hence pi
will not propose id(m) in any IC instance k′ > k.
2) pi has yet to RB-deliver m. Since id(m) ∈ idSetk at pi,
then id(m) is added to the ordered list on pi. When pi
RB-delivers m, by the algorithm, m will not be added
to the unordered set. So again pi will not propose id(m)
in any IC instance k′ > k
For id(m) to be in idSetk′ decided in any IC instance k′ > k,
some process would have to propose id(m) in instance k′. But
as we saw, it is impossible.
Lemma 3. Algorithm 2 satisfies the validity property of CAB.
Proof. We need to show that if a correct process pi CAB-casts
a message m with predicate q, and eventual stable evaluation
holds for q, then pi eventually CAB-delivers m. We give a
proof by a contradiction. Assume that pi never CAB-delivers
m (with q).
Since pi CAB-casts a message m with predicate q, there
exists some message msg , such that msg .m = m and
msg .q = q, which was RB-cast by pi. Since pi is correct,
by the validity property of RB, pi RB-delivers msg . By the
agreement property of RB all correct processes will eventually
RB-deliver msg .
Upon RB-delivery of msg , pi adds id(m) to the unordered
set and then repeatedly proposes id(m) until id(m) is no
longer in unordered . Since all correct processes will even-
tually RB-deliver msg , all propositions in some instance k
of IC will contain id(m). By the termination property of IC,
some decision is made for instance k. By the uniform validity
property of indirect consensus, this decision must be idSetk,
such that id(m) ∈ idSetk. Then, by Lemma 1 pi eventually
CAB-delivers m, a contradiction.
Lemma 4. Algorithm 2 satisfies the uniform integrity property
of CAB.
Proof. We need to show that for any message m with predicate
q, every process pi CAB-delivers m at most once, and only
if (m, q) was previously CAB-cast and q(m) = true at pi.
The last condition follows directly from the algorithm. We
now consider the rest of the conditions.
From the algorithm we know that in order for processes pi
to CAB-deliver m (with q), message msg , such that msg .m =
m and msg .q = q must be in received at pi. It means that
Algorithm 2 Conditional Atomic Broadcast for process pi
1: received = ∅ // set of messages received by the process
2: unordered = ∅ // set of identifiers of messages received but not yet ordered by the process
// each message msg has a unique identifier denoted by id(msg)
3: ordered = [] // sequence of identifiers of messages ordered but not yet CAB-delivered by the process
4: k = 0 // serial number for consensus executions
5: procedure CAB-cast(m : Message, q : Predicate) // to CAB-cast a message m with a test predicate q : Message→ Boolean
6: msg.m = m
7: msg.q = q
8: RB-cast(msg)
9: function test(ids : set〈Message id〉)
10: return ∀id ∈ ids : ∃msg ∈ received : id(msg) = id ∧msg.q(msg.m)
11: upon RB-deliver(msg : Message)
12: received = received ∪ {msg}
13: if id(msg) 6∈ ordered then
14: unordered = unordered ∪ {id(msg)}
15: upon unordered 6= ∅ // a consensus is run whenever there are unordered messages
16: k = k + 1
17: propose(k, unordered, test) // k distinguishes independent consensus executions
18: wait until decide(k, idSetk)
19: unordered = unordered \ idSetk
20: idSeqk = elements of idSetk (in some deterministic order)
21: ordered = ordered · idSeqk
22: upon ordered 6= ∅ ∧ ∃msg ∈ received : ordered.head = id(msg) ∧msg.q(msg.m) // delivers messages ordered and received
23: CAB-deliver(msg.m)
24: ordered = ordered.tail
pi must RB-deliver msg . By the uniform integrity of RB,
some process must have had RB-cast msg . By the algorithm,
it could only happen when some process CAB-cast m with
predicate q. It means that the process must have RB-cast some
message msg , such that msg .m = m and msg .q = q.
For m to be CAB-delivered by pi, id(m) must be in
ordered at pi. By Lemma 2 there exists only one instance
k of IC, such that id(m) ∈ idSetk at pi. By the algorithm,
id(m) ∈ ordered at pi. Once pi CAB-delivers m, pi re-
moves id(m) from the ordered list. This way m cannot be
CAB-delivered more than once.
Lemma 5. Algorithm 2 satisfies the uniform agreement prop-
erty of CAB.
Proof. We need to show that if a process pi (correct or
not) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q), and eventual stable
evaluation holds for q, then all correct processes eventually
CAB-deliver m (with q).
Since pi CAB-delivers m (with q), by the algorithm m ∈
received on pi, and q is satisfied on pi. Also by the algorithm,
id(m) ∈ isSetk of some decided IC instance k at pi. By the
no loss property of IC, when pi decides in instance k (at some
time t), one correct process (say pj) must have evaluated the
test function to true. Hence at time t:
1) m ∈ received at pj , and
2) q = true at pj .
It means that pj must have had RB-delivered m (with
q). By the agreement property of RB, all correct processes
will eventually RB-deliver m (with q). By eventual stable
evaluation, q(m) is eventually true for all correct processes.
By the termination property of IC, each correct process pj
eventually decides in instance k. By the uniform agreement
property of IC, pj decides on idSetk and id(m) ∈ idSetk.
By Lemma 1, each correct process pj CAB-delivers m.
Lemma 6. Algorithm 2 satisfies the uniform total order
property of CAB.
Proof. We must show that if some process pi (correct or
faulty) CAB-delivers m (with predicate q) before m′ (with
predicate q′), then every process pj CAB-delivers m′ (with
q′) only after it has CAB-delivered m (with q).
Let id(m) be decided in some instance k of IC, and id(m′)
be decided in some instance k′ of IC. By Lemma 2, there do
not exist other instance k′′ and k′′′ in which id(m) and id(m′)
are decided, respectively. We have three cases to consider:
• if k = k′, then it is obvious that all processes must
CAB-deliver m and m′ in the same order (they are
CAB-delivered in some deterministic order by sorting
idSetk,
• if k < k′ then, by the algorithm, every process first needs
to CAB-deliver all messages with identifiers in idSetk
before it can CAB-deliver messages with identifiers from
idSetk′ (idSeqk/idSeqk′ is appended to the ordered list
at the process and messages are CAB-delivered at the
process according to the order of the ordered list.
• if k > k′, by the above argument every process first needs
to CAB-deliver all messages with identifiers in idSetk′
before it can CAB-deliver messages with identifiers from
idSetk; this however is impossible by our assumption
that some process pi (correct or faulty) CAB-delivers m
before m′.
Hence, all processes CAB-deliver m and m′ in the same order.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 2 satisfies conditional atomic broad-
cast.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 3, 4, 5 and
6.
Algorithm 3 StateObject for some replica
1: var db : map〈Id,Value〉
2: var undoLog : map〈Req, map〈Id,Value〉〉
3: function execute(r : Req)
4: var undoMap : map〈Id,Value〉
5: execute r.op line by line
6: upon read(id : Id)
7: return db[id ]
8: upon write(id : Id, v : Value)
9: if undoMap[id ] = ⊥ then
10: undoMap[id ] = db[id ]
11: db[id ] = v
12: upon return(response : Resp)
13: undoLog[r] = undoMap
14: return response
15: function rollback(r : Req)
16: var undoMap = undoLog[r]
17: for (id , v) ∈ undoMap do
18: db[id ] = v
19: undoLog = undoLog \ (r, undoMap)
B. The state properties
We follow the description from [24].
Algorithm 3 shows a pseudocode of StateObject, a refer-
ential implementation of state for arbitrary F (a specialized
one can be used for a specific F). We assume that each
operation can be specified as a composition of read and write
operations on registers together with some local computation.
The assumption is sensible, as the operations are executed
locally, in a sequential manner, and thus no stronger primitives
than registers (such as CAS, fetch-and-add, etc.) are necessary.
The StateObject keeps an undo log which allows it to revoke
the effects of any request executed so far.
C. Correctness guarantees of Creek
As explained in [24], Bayou exhibits a phenomenon which
we call circular causality. This phenomenon signifies a situa-
tion in which, by examining the return values of the operations
processed by a system, one may discover a cycle in the causal
dependency between the operations. This behavior can be
observed in some Creek’s executions. the duplicate(),
Consider an execution in which a weak operation observes
the tentative executions of two strong operations (opa and
opb) in one order (say opa, opb), and then some other weak
operation observes the same two strong operations in the
opposite order (opb, opa), when the strong operations are
committed. In order to avoid circular causality, the execution
of strong operations must be deferred until the final execution
order is known. In our algorithm, we would add a strong
operation op to executed only after its identifier has been
CAB-delivered.
Informally, in order to prove that Creek satisfies sequential
consistency [47] for strong operations, we need to show that
the stable return values produced by Creek are such that they
can be obtained by a sequential execution of all operations
in some total order that respects the program order of every
replica. Intuitively, this total order corresponds to the order
of operations on the committed list. Note that in Creek the
execution of operations always respects the order in which
each replica invokes operations: weak operations invoked by
each replica pi are ordered using their timestamps and dots,
both of which are monotonically increasing. When pi invokes
a strong operation op, it has a timestamp that is at least as
large as the timestamp of the last weak operation invoked by
pi, but the strong operation’s dot is strictly larger than dot
of every weak operation invoked previously by pi. Hence the
tentative execution of op will happen after the execution of all
weak operations invoked previously by pi. When the identifier
of op is CAB-delivered and thus op moved from the tentative
to the committed list, the relative order between op and weak
operations previously invoked by pi is maintained (see the
commit function).
Creek satisfies fluctuating eventual consistency (FEC) for
weak operations. Intuitively, FEC requires that each operation
observes some serialization of (a subset) of operations already
submitted to the system (each operation executes on a replica
state that has been obtained by a serial execution of the opera-
tions given). However, the serializations observed by different
weak operations gravitate towards one, ever growing single
serialization. In other words, any operation op can be observed
only a finite number of times by other operations in an order
which is not equal to the final execution order of op. The
observed serialization corresponds to the committed ·tentative
list in Creek. When the identifiers of strong operations are
CAB-delivered, operations are moved from the tentative to
the end of the committed list. Hence, committed corresponds
to the ever growing single serialization to which all serial-
izations observed during executions of weak operations and
tentative executions of strong operations gravitate.
D. Additional results of experimental evaluation
In Figures 2, 3 and 4 we present some additional test results,
which are discussed in Section VI-C.
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Figure 2. Test results for scenarios with high contention (TPC-C is setup with scale factor 1). Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we also
present the measured accuracy of speculative execution.
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Figure 3. Test results for scenarios with medium contention (TPC-C is setup with scale factor 5). Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we
also present the measured accuracy of speculative execution.
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Figure 4. Test results for scenarios with low contention (TPC-C is setup with scale factor 20). Besides the on-replica latency and the execution ratio we also
present the measured accuracy of speculative execution.
